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In the follow-up of the seminal speech of Friedman (1977), there has originated a still
ongoing debate about the link between inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty (Ball, 1992;
Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986). However, empirical testing of the causes and consequences of
increased inﬂation uncertainty necessitates a valid measure. Given that inﬂation uncertainty
is an unobserved variable, many diﬀerent measures have been proposed in the literature.
Some studies rely on survey-based measures, others depend on volatility derived from time
series models, and some use realized forecast errors. Each measure is derived from diﬀerent as-
sumptions and it is unclear whether an individual measure delivers the correct signal. That is,
any individual measure most likely suﬀers from idiosyncratic measurement error. Hence, the
relationship between uncertainty and macroeconomic variables is subject of a lively debate.1
In this study, we propose an approach to mitigate the idiosyncratic measurement error prob-
lem. To this end, we derive the most commonly used measures of inﬂation uncertainty such as,
for instance, disagreement, conditional as well as realized forecast error variance. Moreover,
we put forward a forecast-based approach which complements the survey-based measures.
We use these measures to construct an indicator of inﬂation uncertainty that condenses the
information contained in all measures and, hence, provides a reliable signal. Furthermore, the
approach helps us to analyze to which extent individual measure delivers misleading signals.
In particular, we discuss whether disagreement of survey expectations is a good proxy for
uncertainty.2
It turns out that all measures are driven by a common component. Notably, each individual
measure contributes to the common component, and the indicator remains largely unaﬀected
if we discard one of the measures. It appears that also disagreement from surveys co-moves
with the other measures. However, some caution is warranted because it turns out that re-
spondents tend to cluster their forecasts around the “consensus” forecast in more turbulent
times. Moreover, we ﬁnd that individual measures have the tendency to drift apart if uncer-
tainty rises. That is, the measurement error problem seems to be larger during “uncertain
1A number of studies for the U.S. ﬁnd that inﬂation causes inﬂation uncertainty. Davis and Kanago (2000)
provide an overview. Others ﬁnd evidence of the opposite hypothesis. See, for instance, Bhar and Hamori
(2004) and Fountas and Karanasos (2007). Mixed results with respect to the direction of causality are obtained
inter alia by Grier and Perry (1998) and Berument and Dincer (2005).
2The relation between disagreement and uncertainty is subject to an ongoing debate.
Bomberger and Frazer (1981), Bomberger (1996, 1999) and Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2003) ﬁnd sup-
portive results, other studies report only a weak relationship or reject disagreement as a proxy
(Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Lahiri et al., 1988; Rich and Butler, 1998; D¨ opke and Fritsche, 2006;
Rich and Tracy, 2010). Lahiri and Sheng (2010) ﬁnd that disagreement is a reliable proxy whenever
consensus uncertainty (forecast error variance associated with the mean of individual forecasts) is low.
1times”. This is unfortunate if we want to analyze the relation between uncertainty and other
economic variables. Similar to previous studies, we obtain contradictory results if we use in-
dividual measures to test the link between inﬂation uncertainty and inﬂation. Overall, these
ﬁndings further emphasize the beneﬁts of the indicator approach.
In a next step, we make use of the advantages of our approach and study the relationship
between inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty. This topic has recently regained relevance because
there are claims to increase the inﬂation target of central bank to mitigate, for instance, the
problem of excessive government debt.3 However, the Friedman-Ball hypothesis suggests that
high inﬂation rates may lead to increased inﬂation uncertainty which brings about economic
cost. The reason is that increased uncertainty would adversely aﬀect investment decisions
and bond prices. It turns out that the link is from inﬂation to higher uncertainty. If we
consider an inﬂationary shock, however, it appears that uncertainty decreases temporarily.
Such a behavior seems to be traceable to the energy component in CPI. In particular, we
do not obtain a decrease if we consider a shock to core inﬂation. In either case, uncertainty
increases swiftly after a couple of months. Overall, our results are in favor of the Friedman-
Ball hypothesis. That is, there appears to be an additional cost of maintaining high inﬂation
rates.
A few studies compare diﬀerent approaches to measure uncertainty. For instance,
Batchelor and Dua (1993, 1996), and Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2003) contrast uncertainty de-
rived from subjective forecast densities contained in the U.S. Survey of Professional Fore-
casters (SPF) with diﬀerent types of model-based measures. It appears that both categories
do not have much in common. Chua et al. (2011) identify a particular GARCH model that
matches the SPF measure closest. These studies consider subjective densities as a benchmark
because this measure is theoretically appealing. Such a procedure is valid if the benchmark
measure is not severely contaminated by measurement error. However, we may doubt that
this is the case. First, quite a few assumptions have to be made to calculate a measure of
uncertainty from SPF forecast densities (see, for instance, D’Amico and Orphanides, 2008;
Rich and Tracy, 2010). Second, the survey may itself be subject to measurement error, for
instance, if participants put little eﬀort in correctly answering the questionnaire. In contrast
to our indicator, the SPF measures are rather noisy which suggests that measurement error
is present (see Batchelor and Dua, 1993, 1996; Diebold et al., 1999; Giordani and S¨ oderlind,
3See, for instance, the IMF Staﬀ Position Note by Olivier Blanchard et al. (SPN/10/03), the address by
Charles L. Evans at the Outlook Luncheon on Dec 5, 2011, the NY Times Blog on May 28, 2011 by Paul
Krugman, and the comment by Ken Rogoﬀ in the Financial Times on Aug 8, 2011.
22003; S¨ oderlind, 2011). Therefore, we take a diﬀerent stand and assume that a priori each
individual measure of uncertainty is equally informative.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the measures
of inﬂation uncertainty. The relation between the diﬀerent measures is analyzed in section 3.
In section 4, we test the Friedman-Ball hypothesis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Calculating measures of inﬂation uncertainty
In the following, we introduce the empirical measures for inﬂation uncertainty. They are
derived from diﬀerent approaches put forward in previous studies and rely on distinct concepts
and assumptions. Hence, they are potentially exposed to diﬀerent types of measurement
error. We introduce survey-based measures, as well as model-based measures. Moreover,
we propose a forecast-based approach. Common information contained in these individual
measures builds the basis for the indicator in section 3.
2.1 Survey-based measures
In a ﬁrst step, we focus on uncertainty measures which are derived from survey data. Our
data source is provided by Consensus Economics Inc. (CE). CE is advantageous because
it polls professional forecasters who should be well informed about the current state of the
economy. Besides, individual data is provided and the names of the forecasters are given
aside the numbers. Hence, there is a strong incentive to make a well-informed prediction in
order not to damage the reputation.4 Against this background, Dovern and Weisser (2011)
ﬁnd that individual forecasts for U.S. inﬂation are largely unbiased. Moreover, it has the
advantage that it runs on a monthly frequency. As uncertainty may move abruptly, many of
the eﬀects we want to measure would be washed out in low frequency data. We use data from
1990:M1 to 2009:M12.5
Bomberger and Frazer (1981), Cukierman and Wachtel (1982), and Batchelor and Dua (1993,
1996) propose the root mean squared error (rmses
t) as a measure of uncertainty. It is calcu-
4A more detailed description of the data is found in appendix A.1.
5Owing to the survey design, studies using probabilistic expectations from SPF are restricted to a yearly
frequency. Hence, we cannot use SPF data for the main analysis in this paper. However, as SPF is a common
benchmark we compare both approaches in appendix B.4.













where πt+12 denotes realized 12-month ahead CPI inﬂation and πe
i,t denotes the individ-
ual point forecast from CE made at time t. As far as the timing is concerned, we follow
Batchelor and Dua (1993, 1996). That is, an observation for uncertainty at time t is available
only when realized inﬂation is observed at time t + 12.
Bomberger and Frazer (1981), Bomberger (1996, 1999), and Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2003)
propose the cross-sectional dispersion of point forecasts (disagreement) as a measure of un-
certainty. Instead of using the cross-sectional standard deviation of forecasts, we follow
Mankiw et al. (2003) and rely on the interquartile range (iqrs) since it is more robust to
outliers. iqrs is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the 25th and the 75th percentile.6
Mankiw et al. (2003) point out that the distribution of point forecasts may become multi-
modal if model uncertainty is high, for instance, around structural breaks. Hence, the form
of the distribution of individual forecasts may contain information about uncertainty beyond
a dispersion measure. Hence, Rich and Tracy (for instance, 2010) suggest using a histogram-









where p(k) denotes the relative frequency of individual forecasts falling in a certain interval k.
The concept of entropy provides additional information in comparison to the measure of iqrs
in two ways. First, given a certain cross-sectional standard deviation of forecasts, entropy
changes with the shape of the histogram of forecasts. In particular, the normal distribution
exhibits a higher entropy than any other distribution of the same variance (Vasicek, 1976).
Second, given a ﬁxed number of bins and a constant bin width, the histogram-based entropy
is maximized if the forecasts are distributed equally among all bins.
6We also computed the standard deviation and the quasi-standard deviation of forecasts. The quasi-
standard deviation is deﬁned as half the diﬀerence between the 16th and 84th percentile. With normally
distributed data, this measure coincides with the standard deviation. These alternative measures are highly
correlated with iqrs with correlation coeﬃcient ρ = 0.86 and 0.90, respectively.
42.2 Forecast-based measures
As a complement to the survey-based measures, we put forward a forecast-based approach that
is based on multiple forecast models. We rely on VAR models which are a popular forecast
device because of their ability to generate multi-step predictions. To obtain a time-varying
uncertainty measure, Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2003) recursively estimate a single VAR model
and calculate a standard deviation of the forecast error of inﬂation for each period. Chua et al.
(2011) follow this idea by deriving error bands from the recursive bootstrapped VAR approach
proposed by Peng and Yang (2008). However, this approach comes at the cost of being
conditional on a speciﬁc forecast model which is assumed to provide the correct description
of the data. Moreover, the model is assumed to be the same for all forecasters. Hence, model
uncertainty is virtually absent and forecaster diversity is neglected. Finally, uncertainty
is derived from VAR residuals which are assumed to be homoscedastic. In eﬀect, this is
not consistent with the presumption that uncertainty changes systematically over time. To
overcome these possible drawbacks, we propose a forecast-based approach which relies on a
variety of forecast models.7 That is, we do not use information contained in residuals but
rather resort to the point forecasts of diﬀerent VAR models.
To obtain multiple forecast models, we ﬁrst select a number of activity variables proposed
by Stock and Watson (1999) to forecast U.S. inﬂation. Stock and Watson (1999) identify
diﬀerent sub-groups of variables. To keep the analysis tractable, we choose one representative
from each of these sub-groups. We end up with 15 variables which are described in table A.1
in the appendix. Note that the estimation period contains the disinﬂation period during the
1980ies. Hence, inﬂation enters in ﬁrst diﬀerences (Stock and Watson, 1999, 2007). To derive
twelve-months ahead forecasts for inﬂation, we build a number of diﬀerent VAR models.
Each VAR model is limited in size to avoid over-ﬁtting problems. It comprises the target
variable and up to four additional activity variables. Finally, we construct all VAR models
that fulﬁl this criterion, i.e. we consider all possibilities to choose up to four variables out
of the 15 activity variables. The lag length of each VAR model is determined by BIC, and
we end up with a total number of 1.941 diﬀerent inﬂation forecasts for each month. Note
that the estimation proceeds recursively. That is, we use data from 1970:M1 up to the period
in which the forecast is made. Hence, we calculate forecasts for inﬂation one year ahead for
each month between 1991:M1 and 2010:M12. By design, the forecast-based approach mimics
a survey of professional forecasters such as the CE survey. Calculating RMSE as deﬁned in
equation (1) yields a forecast-based measure of inﬂation uncertainty (rmsef). Forecast-based
7Hartmann and Herwartz (2009) use an approach similar to ours to derive a measure of uncertainty from
ﬁve diﬀerent structural models.
5disagreement (iqrf) is given by the dispersion among the point forecasts measured by the
interquartile range. As in equation (2), we also calculate an entropy-based measure (entf).
2.3 Model-based measures
2.3.1 Conditional forecast error variance
ARCH models of many diﬀerent shapes have been extensively used to model inﬂation uncer-
tainty in the U.S.8 A number of studies highlight that there may be many structural breaks in
the inﬂation process.9 To account for such events like changes in the monetary regime or the
level of steady-state inﬂation, we follow these studies and opt for a time-varying parameter
GARCH (TVP-GARCH) model. This has the advantage of being ﬂexible enough to allow
for a non-stationary inﬂation rate. In terms of Ball and Cecchetti (1990), time variation also
adds a second long-term dimension to uncertainty. The TVP-GARCH model provides a co-
herent framework for the analysis of uncertainty in the sense that it combines conditional
error variance as well as model uncertainty into forecast error variance (Evans, 1991). The
model is given by a signal equation (3), a state equation (4) and equation (5) describing the
evolvement of conditional error variance.
πt = [1 πt−1 πt−2] αt + et et ∼ N(0,ht) (3)
αt+1 = αt + ηt ηt ∼ N(0,Q) (4)









Here, αt is a vector of time-varying coeﬃcients. We model inﬂation as an AR(2) process which
meets the needs to reproduce the cyclical behavior. ht describes conditional error variance and
Q is a homoscedastic covariance matrix of shocks ηt. The coeﬃcient vector follows a random
walk. Estimations are based on monthly data running from 1990:M1 through 2009:M12.10
Finally, the Kalman ﬁlter provides an estimate for the variance of forecast errors. We use the
square root of this variance to measure uncertainty which is labeled garch. Note that the
measure summarizes model uncertainty emerging from time-variation of the coeﬃcients and
8See, for instance, Engle (1983), Cosimano and Jansen (1988), Brunner and Hess (1993), Grier and Perry
(1996), Grier and Perry (2000), Elder (2004), Grier et al. (2004) and Chang and He (2010).
9See, for instance, Evans (1991), Evans and Wachtel (1993), Berument et al. (2005),
Caporale and Kontonikas (2009), and Caporale et al. (2010).
10Parameter estimates are given in table A.2 in the appendix. Speciﬁcation tests do not indicate either
autocorrelation or remaining ARCH eﬀects in the model innovations.
6uncertainty emerging from the shock process ηt (see Evans, 1991; Caporale et al., 2010, for
a detailed explanation).
2.3.2 Stochastic volatility
Stochastic volatility (SV) models have been used in ﬁnancial econometrics to model error vari-
ance as a latent stochastic process (see, among others, Harvey et al., 1994; Kim et al., 1998).
Moreover, they have been proposed as a forecast model for U.S. inﬂation (Stock and Watson,
2007). In contrast to ARCH models where error variance is fully described by its own past,
here, the variance of ﬁrst moment shocks is assumed to be driven by an exogenous stochastic
process. Albeit their ability to model shocks to second moments, so far, stochastic volatility
models are rarely used to analyze inﬂation uncertainty. In the following, we adopt the model
proposed by Stock and Watson (2007) whose state-space representation is given by equations
(6) to (10).
πt = µt + et et ∼ N(0,σ
2
e,t) (6)


















Here, et is a short-term shock in the measurement equation (6) with variance σ2
e,t. Moreover,
the permanent component of inﬂation µt follows a random walk which is driven by a permanent
(level) shock ηt with variance σ2
η,t.11 We follow the arguments of Ball and Cecchetti (1990)
and use the square root of the variance of permanent shocks σ2
η,t as the measure of inﬂation
uncertainty. In the following, it is denoted by ucsv.
11The model is estimated with the Gibbs sampler. See also Dovern et al. (2009) for an application of the
stochastic volatility model to diﬀerent macroeconomic variables.
73 Characteristics of uncertainty measures
3.1 Descriptive analysis
We generate eight individual uncertainty measures: three survey-based measures (iqrs, ents,
rmses), three forecast-based measures (iqrf, entf, rmsef), and two model-based measures
(garch, ucsv).12 All eight measures require a number of assumptions to work as good proxies
for uncertainty. In general, deriving valid measures from survey-based approaches assumes
that the survey is conducted such that bias and measurement error is small. Moreover,
disagreement and entropy are valid proxies only if there is a positive correlation between the
dispersion of forecasts of respondents and uncertainty of the participants. However, it might
be the case that individual forecasters are highly uncertain and, therefore, are reluctant to
deviate from the other forecasters. rmse assumes that high forecast errors in the past increase
an individual forecaster’s uncertainty about his current point estimate. Measures inferred
from the forecast-based approach work as indicators for uncertainty if linear time series models
are a good approximation of the model used by individual forecasters. Finally, model-based
measures are conditional on a speciﬁc forecast model. Moreover, this particular model is
assumed to be the same for all forecasters. In addition, garch provides the conditional variance
which is dependent on past forecast errors. By contrast, ucsv seems to be more appealing
from a theoretical point of view because the approach delivers a forecast error variance which
is driven by exogenous second moment shocks. Overall, the respective assumptions are most
likely not fulﬁlled completely. Hence, each measure proposed in the literature is probably
contaminated by some sort of measurement error suggesting that it is diﬃcult to identify a
benchmark approach from these measures. By contrast, it should be beneﬁcial to base the
analysis on information contained in all measures jointly.
In the following, we present some descriptive statistics to characterize the individual measures.
Figure 1 displays the autocorrelation of the eight uncertainty measures on the main diagonal.
It turns out that the autocorrelation is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level for each
measure. The lowest degree of autocorrelation is found for survey disagreement, whereas, by
construction, the most sluggish measure is ucsv. In general, inﬂation uncertainty seems to be
a persistent phenomenon.
Considering cross-correlations on the oﬀ-diagonal elements of ﬁgure 1, we ﬁnd that they are
high and signiﬁcantly positive among all series and throughout all leads and lags. We take
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Note: The bars represent cross-correlations corr(yi,t,yj,t+k) for each pair of variables where yi,t denotes the
row i variable and yj,t+k is given in the column j. k varies between −12 and +12. The 5% signiﬁcance level
is indicated by the horizontal line.
Figure 1: Cross-correlation of uncertainty measures
this as a ﬁrst indication that all measures contain an important common component. Also
note that rmses and rmsef tend to lead the other measures.
We also present contemporaneous correlations of the individual uncertainty measures with
other variables in table B.1 in appendix B.1. It turns out that each individual measure has
signiﬁcant correlations with many economic and ﬁnancial variables. Moreover, the sign of
the correlations seems to be unambiguous. For instance, there is a strong positive correlation
with indicators of ﬁnancial market risk. Moreover, the variability of commodity prices and
interest rates seem to be positively related. Furthermore, all measures seem to move counter-
cyclically, and they are negatively related to house prices, stock returns, and commodity
9prices. Overall, correlations are roughly in line with what we would expect from a measure of
inﬂation uncertainty, and each measure seems to carry information about underlying inﬂation
uncertainty. However, there appear to be diﬀerences with respect to the strength of the
correlation. Hence, we may obtain more robust results if we use information from all measures
jointly.
The extent of co-movement over time is revealed in ﬁgure 2. Here, we depict the evolution
of the cross-sectional standard deviation between measures at each point in time. We ob-
serve that the standard deviation ﬂuctuates in a rather narrow band during the ﬁrst half
of the sample, whereas the measures start to diverge beginning in 2005. The co-movement
between all eight measures further decreases during the recent crisis. It turns out that the
cross-sectional mean of all eight measures and the associated standard deviation are strongly
correlated (ρ = 0.66). Thus, during more turbulent times, individual measures have the
tendency to drift apart and measuring uncertainty is more challenging. It appears that a
method attenuating the measurement error problem is beneﬁcial particularly in times of high
uncertainty.









std between uncertainty measures
Note: Individual uncertainty measures have been standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one
before calculating the cross-sectional standard deviation.
Figure 2: Standard deviation of uncertainty measures
3.2 Common characteristics
To eliminate the idiosyncratic components (i.e. idiosyncratic measurement error) from the
data, we can exploit the commonalities among individual measures documented in the pre-
vious section. That is, we use the cross-sectional dimension of the data to alleviate the
10measurement error problem. For this purpose, we conduct a Principal Component Analy-
sis. As mentioned above, the two variables rmses and rmsef seem to lead the rest of the
indicators. We obtain a maximum average cross correlation if we consider 8 and 5 lags, re-
spectively. Note that rmse measures seem to move early because of the timing we impose
(compare equation (1)). When estimating the common factors, we follow Stock and Watson
(2002) and account for the lead characteristics of these variables. Table 1 shows the loading
coeﬃcients of the ﬁrst three principal components and the individual and cumulative variance
proportions of those components.
PC 1 PC 2 PC 3
Eigenvalues 5.30 0.85 0.70
Variance Proportion 0.66 0.11 0.09
Cumulative Proportion 0.66 0.77 0.86
Eigenvectors
iqrs 0.34 0.44 −0.33
ents 0.31 0.58 −0.36
rmses 0.35 −0.17 0.33
iqrf 0.37 −0.41 −0.30
entf 0.33 −0.53 −0.45
rmsef 0.37 0.00 0.17
garch 0.38 0.05 0.35
ucsv 0.38 0.08 0.46
Table 1: Loadings of ﬁrst three principal components
The ﬁrst principal component (PC1) accounts for the major part of the dynamics as it already
explains 66% of the total variation of the underlying series. Notably, all eight loading coeﬃ-
cients are clearly positive and lie between 0.31 and 0.38. That is, the loadings are all similar in
magnitude and there is no single series driving the component. Moreover, the indicator does
not hinge on one of the individual measures as it remains virtually unaﬀected if we discard
one of the measures.13 In other words, it appears that there is a common driving force that
impacts each individual measure in a similar way. PC1 is shown in ﬁgure 3.14 The continuing
increase in uncertainty starting in 2006 stands out. This behavior is also apparent in each of
13We recalculate the indicator leaving out one of the individual measures in turn. Results are presented in
ﬁgure B.3 in appendix B.3.
14As a robustness check, we compare PC1 to uncertainty measures derived from SPF data in appendix B.4.
It appears that PC1 broadly retraces the movements of SPF. However, it turns out that the SPF measure is
much more volatile than PC1. Such a ﬁnding may occur because, by construction, survey data is probably
inﬂuenced by some kind of measurement error.
11the individual uncertainty measures. A maximum in uncertainty is found in December 2008
and January 2009 which coincides roughly with the peak of the recent economic crisis.15










Figure 3: Uncertainty indicator (PC1)
To analyze the information content of PC1, we study the co-movement of PC1 with variables
that should be related to inﬂation uncertainty. Contemporaneous correlations of PC1 and a
collection of key variables are presented in table 2. It turns out that PC1 is closely linked to the
variability of nominal variables such as commodity prices, interest rates, and money. Similarly,
variables representing ﬁnancial market risk (vix, ted spreads, corporate bond spreads, and
squared returns) seem to rise with PC1. Moreover, PC1 appears to be positively linked to the
variability of production growth. Finally, all variables representing the business cycle indicate
that inﬂation uncertainty is associated with economic contraction. We also observe a negative
association with short-term interest rates which are, in general, pro-cyclical over the business
cycle. Notably, the correlation obtained for long-term rates is somewhat lower compared to
short-term rates. This is probably due to the fact that the long-term interest rates is partly
driven by the inﬂation risk premium which tends to increase along with inﬂation uncertainty.
15Generally speaking, uncertainty is a bounded variable. However, the underlying series might be observa-
tionally equivalent to a non-stationary process. We analyze this issue in appendix B.2. Common unit-root
tests deliver rather mixed results. However, assuming non-stationarity of all series, we apply a parametric
approach to extract one common trend from the data. It turns out that such a proceeding produces results
that are similar to the results from the non-parametric PCA approach.
12PC1 PC2 PC3 PC1 PC2 PC3
(∆π)2 0.37 0.14 wti
(∆πcore)2 0.15 ppicomm −0.14 0.14
∆M2 0.20 ppiind −0.16
(∆M2)2 0.36 crb −0.28 0.23
ffr −0.48 (∆wti)2 0.22 −0.14
r3M −0.53 (∆ppicomm)2 0.47
r10Y −0.28 −0.17 −0.18 (∆ppiind)2 0.43
∆ffr −0.29 0.27 (∆crbreturn)2 0.42
∆r3M −0.19 0.22 ism −0.47 0.15
∆r10Y ismprod −0.43 0.15
abs(∆ffr) 0.13 −0.16 −0.18 pmi −0.53 0.17
abs(∆r3M) −0.14 −0.18 pmiprod −0.56 0.14
abs(∆r10Y ) 0.35 mhs −0.79 0.14
vix 0.53 confidence −0.59 0.21
ted 0.32 cu −0.69 −0.16
risk 0.39 −0.35 cuman −0.72 −0.16
sp500 −0.16 cuexIT −0.76 −0.17
dj −0.16 ∆y −0.81
dj5000 −0.14 ∆yman −0.82
sp5002 0.27 (∆y)2 0.53 −0.19
dj2 0.24 (∆yman)2 0.58 −0.17
dj50002 0.27 ∆empl −0.77
house −0.61 0.20 ∆jobless 0.67 −0.20
∆house −0.16 ∆u 0.78 −0.17
(∆house)2 0.46 0.31 ur 0.50 −0.17
recession 0.61 −0.16 ∆ur 0.79 −0.15
Note: Positive correlations are printed in bold and negative correlations are in lightface. Correlations that
are insigniﬁcant at the 5% level do not appear in the table. A detailed description of economic variables is
given in table B.2 in appendix B.1.
Table 2: Correlations of principal components with economic and ﬁnancial variables
3.3 Group-speciﬁc characteristics
We now shed some light on characteristics that are speciﬁc to (groups of) individual measures.
That is, we analyze the movements that are not explained by the common component. To
this end, we analyze the second principal component (PC2) which accounts for 11% of the
total variance of the data. Notably, PC2 provides some insight into the dynamic interrelation
of individual uncertainty measures. We obtain high negative loadings for the two forecast-
based measures iqrf and entf (−0.41 and −0.53) and, in contrast, high positive loadings are
found for the two survey-based variables iqrs and ents (0.44 and 0.58). From the signs of
the loadings, we infer that PC2 is driven by factors that separate movements of survey-based
13and forecast-based measures. The other variables do not contribute to this component in a
signiﬁcant way.




















Figure 4: Second and third principal component (PC2, PC3)
The left panel of ﬁgure 4 depicts PC2. It appears that PC2 is far from being white noise. That
is, deviations between survey-based and forecast-based measures are systematic. To identify
situations where both groups of measures move less synchronized, we analyze correlations of
PC2 to economic variables in table 2. It turns out that there are fewer signiﬁcant correlations
than for PC1. In opposition to PC1, PC2 co-moves with the business cycle. Hence, the wedge
between forecast-based and survey-based measures tends to increase in recessions or during
economic downturns. That is, iqrs and ents tend to decrease during recessions while forecast-
based measures tend to rise. Similarly, the wedge between both groups of measures increases
when the corporate bond risk premium is high or output variability increases. Moreover, a
rise in commodity prices is associated with an increase in PC2, probably reﬂecting the fact
that these prices tend to co-move with the business cycle. Hence, disagreement appears to be
subject to systematic measurement error in more turbulent times such as economic downturns.
For an economic interpretation, note that, by design, the forecast-based approach mimics a
survey of professional forecasters such as the CE survey. However, a conceptual discrepancy
to survey-based measures should be highlighted. The forecast-based approach provides a
purely mechanistic way to deal with heterogeneous information. As a consequence, VAR
model forecasts almost inevitably diverge when indicators provide heterogeneous signals. By
contrast, in a survey, the way information is combined into a forecast is to a non-negligible
extent governed by subjective elements. For instance, the choice of a particular forecast
model, the weights attached to diﬀerent pieces of information, or judgmental adjustments may
inﬂuence the forecast reported. Notably, if forecasters are risk-averse, they may choose to stick
14to the consensus if uncertainty is high, and forecast dispersion may decline. Such a behavior
appears to occur here during economically turbulent times such as recessions. Overall, results
suggest that using only survey disagreement as a measure of inﬂation uncertainty may deliver
misleading results.
The third principal component (PC3) is depicted in the right panel of ﬁgure 4. It features
highly negative loadings for all disagreement measures (iqrs, ents, iqrf, entf), whereas the
other measures (rmses, rmsef, garch, ucsv) load positively. That is, PC3 appears to capture
some of the observed divergence of individual measures (see also ﬁgure 2). Note that PC3 is
relatively unsystematic and, hence, the correlation to other variables is weak (see table 2).
However, there appears to be a positive correlation with the variability of house prices and
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of short-term interest rates.
4 Test of the Friedman-Ball hypothesis
In the following, we use PC1 to test the relationship between inﬂation and inﬂation uncer-
tainty. Friedman (1977) argues that high inﬂation rates are less predictable than lower rates.
Ball (1992) formalizes the idea stating that inﬂation uncertainty increases in the event of
higher inﬂation because the policy response is harder to predict. In particular, it is harder
for economic agents to forecast when there will be a shift to a tougher monetary policy. In
contrast, Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) argue that the link is from inﬂation uncertainty to
inﬂation. In a Barro-Gordon framework, they claim that, with highly uncertain agents, the
central bank has an incentive to create surprise inﬂation to lower unemployment. The in-
ﬂation - inﬂation uncertainty link has recently gained relevance with the call for a higher
inﬂation target for central banks.
To test the Friedman-Ball hypothesis, we conduct a Granger causality test. To this end,
we estimate bivariate VAR models containing inﬂation and one uncertainty measure. As
we deal with monthly data, the lag length is set to 12. Results are presented in table 3.
Although contemporaneous correlations are rather similar across individual measures, results
of a Granger causality test are rather mixed (see table B.1). rmses and iqrf seem to be
Granger caused by inﬂation but not vice versa whereas for iqrs and garch Granger causality
appears to hold for both directions. For ents and entf, we ﬁnd no dynamic relation to
inﬂation. In the case of rmsef and ucsv, it turns out that uncertainty is Granger causal for
inﬂation. When the same test is conducted for the change of inﬂation, we get almost the
same results. Overall, results appear to be inconclusive, and the choice of the measure seems
15to drive the results. Thus, using individual measures entails the risk that results are driven
by idiosyncratic movements that are unrelated to inﬂation uncertainty.
PC1 irqs ents rmses iqrf entf rmsef garch ucsv
H0: π does not Granger cause IU 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.79 0.08 0.00 0.16
H0: IU does not Granger cause π 0.27 0.01 0.31 0.27 0.48 0.82 0.03 0.03 0.00
H0: ∆π does not Granger cause IU 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.85 0.10 0.00 0.14
H0: IU does not Granger cause ∆π 0.21 0.19 0.01 0.51 0.51 0.30 0.00 0.01 0.00
Note: Granger causality tests are performed for inﬂation π as well as the monthly change of inﬂation ∆π and
inﬂation uncertainty (IU). Numbers are p-values for a Granger causality test.
Table 3: Granger causality test for inﬂation uncertainty and inﬂation
Using PC1 to measure inﬂation uncertainty, we ﬁnd strong support for the Friedman-Ball
hypothesis, i.e., inﬂation Granger causes inﬂation uncertainty but not vice versa. The same
result is obtained if we consider the change in inﬂation. Most notably, results in table 3
suggest that the indicator provides an insurance against idiosyncratic movements of individual
measures.16 To further substantiate this result, we reestimate each bivariate VAR by three-
stage least squares. We employ PC1 as instrument for the individual uncertainty measure
and test whether we can recover the result from above. That is, instead of using PC1 directly,
we take the variation of each individual measure explained by the common component to
identify the eﬀect. We then use the three-stage least squares estimates to perform a Granger
causality test. It turns out that we obtain no case where uncertainty seems to Granger cause
inﬂation. Overall, it appears that idiosyncratic movements of individual measures may mask
the underlying relationships of interest.
According to the Friedman-Ball hypothesis, there is a positive relationship between inﬂation
and inﬂation uncertainty. To assess the sign of the eﬀect of an exogenous increase in inﬂa-
tion on uncertainty, we take a dynamic perspective and calculate impulse response functions
from the bivariate VAR models introduced above. Orthogonal shocks are identiﬁed using
a Cholesky ordering such that uncertainty reacts to a shock to inﬂation instantaneously.17
This is motivated by the fact that uncertainty may move quickly when agents encounter new
macroeconomic information whereas inﬂation is comparatively slow-moving.18
16In appendix C.1, we exclude the recent crisis from the sample and end the analysis in 2007:M8 which is
roughly when the U.S. sub-prime crisis started to take over to other sectors of the economy. We ﬁnd that the
results derived from the indicator still hold. Also note that the results obtained for individual measures are
not robust in the shorter sample.
17We also checked the reverse ordering of variables which does not aﬀect the results in a signiﬁcant way.
18Impulse responses of individual measures are presented in appendix C.2. It turns out that responses
of individual uncertainty measures to a one standard deviation shock to inﬂation are rather heterogenous.
Again, the link from inﬂation to inﬂation uncertainty is not revealed in a conclusive way.
16The left panel of ﬁgure 5 presents the response of the uncertainty indicator PC1 to a one
standard deviation shock to inﬂation. We observe that uncertainty experiences an initial
decline following an inﬂation shock. In other words, directly after the shock, a forecast for
subsequent periods seems to be less uncertain. This may be due to the fact that – given
the sluggishness of inﬂation – a forecast is relatively easy in the period directly following
the inﬂation shock. Let’s consider an inﬂation shock that is the result of a sudden increase
in oil prices. Having observed the shock, this very likely decreases uncertainty associated
with future inﬂation. The reason is that forecasters may be relatively sure to observe an
instantaneous hike in inﬂation rates during the ﬁrst few months after the shock. In the
following periods, inﬂation uncertainty displays a hump-shaped pattern. It quickly increases
and becomes positive ﬁve months after the shock occurred. Thus, the more time has elapsed
since the shock, the more uncertainty is attached to the future course of inﬂation. Let’s
consider again a sudden increase in oil prices. In this case, more and more uncertainty
develops over time because the long-term eﬀects of such an inﬂation shock – e.g. via second
round eﬀects – are less clear-cut. The response of uncertainty to a shock to the oil price (wti)
is depicted in the right panel of ﬁgure 5. The pattern of the impulse response function very
much resembles the response of PC1 to an innovation in inﬂation. Hence, the plot conﬁrms the
hypothesis that the short-term impact of increasing oil prices seems to be relatively clear-cut,
whereas longer lasting eﬀects on the inﬂation rate are uncertain.
























Note: Conﬁdence intervals are obtained from a bias adjusted bootstrap procedure (Kilian, 1998).
Figure 5: Response of inﬂation uncertainty to diﬀerent inﬂation related shocks
In addition to the growing uncertainty about the transmission of a shock, there may be rising
uncertainty about the reaction of the central bank. Note that the latter scenario is very much
in the spirit of Friedman (1977) who recognizes that, given rising rates of inﬂation, economic
17agents become more and more uncertain about the timing and pace at which inﬂation will
return to lower levels again. Overall, the Friedman-Ball hypothesis is conﬁrmed.19
Turning to the left panel of ﬁgure 6, we observe that a shock to core inﬂation (πcore) also
induces a rise in uncertainty. Here, it takes about four months until uncertainty increases. In
contrast to CPI inﬂation, a shock to core inﬂation does not induce a fall in uncertainty in the
ﬁrst periods. We take this as further evidence that the initial decrease in uncertainty after a
shock to CPI inﬂation is traceable to the energy component in CPI. That is, once an energy
price shock has materialized, the short-run impact of this shock on inﬂation seems to be well
known and, thus, reduces forecast uncertainty. In the long run, however, the rise in uncertainty
is even more pronounced after a shock to CPI inﬂation than after a core inﬂation shock.
Notably, following a one-time increase in core inﬂation, uncertainty persistently remains on a
higher level.
Finally, we consider a shock to inﬂation expectations (πe) as measured by the CE mean
forecast (see right panel of ﬁgure 6). Here, an increase in inﬂation expectations is followed
by an instantaneous decline in uncertainty. As in the case of inﬂation and oil price shocks,
agents become more and more uncertain about the future path of inﬂation only in the longer
run, given their expectations. Again, this seems to be reasonable if we assume that shifts in
inﬂation expectations are to a considerable extent driven by energy price movements.
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Note: Conﬁdence intervals are obtained from a bias adjusted bootstrap procedure (Kilian, 1998).
Figure 6: Response of inﬂation uncertainty to diﬀerent inﬂation related shocks (contd.)
19See appendix C.3 for result obtained from standard VARs containing output, inﬂation, a short-term
interest rate, and uncertainty. It turns out that results remain unaﬀected when a larger VAR is employed. In
appendix C.1, we leave out the most recent economic crisis. We ﬁnd that the response of uncertainty to an
inﬂation shock is largely robust to a change in the sample. However, the reaction is signiﬁcant only at the
10% level.
18In the following, we analyze whether the contribution of inﬂationary shocks to uncertainty is
meaningful in an economic sense. To this end, we present in table 4 the forecast error variance
decomposition associated with the bivariate VAR models from the preceding two sections. We
ﬁnd that an inﬂation shock explains roughly 30% after 15 months. Likewise, core inﬂation
(πcore) shows a peak in the longer run. However, with a value of 14%, it contributes less
than headline inﬂation. It takes 15 months until the oil price (wti) contributes substantially.
In contrast, shocks to inﬂation expectations (πe) explain 10% of the variance of inﬂation
uncertainty on impact, and values increase further with the forecast horizon.
horizon 1 5 10 15 20 25
π 0.5 6.0 19.7 30.6 29.2 22.9
πcore 0.0 1.8 7.4 11.8 13.6 14.7
wti 0.1 4.1 10.9 20.2 22.3 19.6
πe 10.5 13.0 15.6 19.0 15.1 12.1
Note: Numbers (as % of total variance) give the part of the variance of inﬂation uncertainty explained by
a shock to the respective economic variable. The respective values are derived from bivariate VAR models.
Variance decompositions are presented for a horizon of 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 months.
Table 4: Forecast error variance decomposition
5 Conclusion
Analyzing various measures of inﬂation uncertainty, we ﬁnd that inﬂation uncertainty has risen
signiﬁcantly in the aftermath of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. This highlights the importance
of understanding the causes and consequences of inﬂation uncertainty. However, empirical
results derived from diﬀerent measures are not so clear-cut. One reason may be that the
assumptions that need to hold for any individual measure to be a valid proxy for uncertainty
diﬀer substantially. Hence, individual measures are likely contaminated with idiosyncratic
measurement error.
We use common information contained in diﬀerent measures to eliminate the measurement
error. To this end, we calculate survey-based measures as well as measures derived from time
series models, and we put forward a forecast-based approach. We ﬁnd that each individual
measure – including disagreement – contains valuable information about inﬂation uncertainty.
It turns out that all measures are driven by a common component which we interpret as an
indicator for inﬂation uncertainty. Note that the indicator mitigates the measurement error
problem and the underlying signal should be revealed with greater precision.
19However, the indicator does not completely explain the variation in the data. We ﬁnd that
individual measures tend to diﬀer more during turbulent times, i.e. when uncertainty is high.
Moreover, it appears that using only survey disagreement as a measure of uncertainty, a
researcher may be confronted with respondents sticking to the consensus during recessions.
Hence, using only survey disagreement as a measure of inﬂation uncertainty may deliver
misleading results.
Subsequently, we use the proposed indicator to test the Friedman-Ball hypothesis. It ap-
pears that Granger causality tests cannot reject the Friedman-Ball hypothesis. Hence, when
the central bank implements a higher inﬂation rate, it is likely followed by increased uncer-
tainty. Eventually, misallocations arising from increased inﬂation uncertainty may give rise
to additional economic cost.
We also study the dynamic response of uncertainty to an inﬂation shock. It appears that
uncertainty initially tends to decrease. However, uncertainty swiftly increases in subsequent
periods. This behavior is traceable to the energy component in CPI inﬂation. Sudden oil
price increases, for instance, are followed by an initial decrease in inﬂation uncertainty. In the
longer run, uncertainty eventually rises because long-term eﬀects of these oil price increases
appear to be harder to predict. Overall, we conclude that higher inﬂation is followed by
higher uncertainty. However, it is diﬃcult to establish causal relationships by empirical
testing only. Hence, in future research we need to obtain a deeper understanding of the
dynamic transmission from inﬂation to uncertainty. We also need to establish causal economic
relationships from theoretical reasoning which would facilitate to ﬁnd ways to prevent inﬂation
uncertainty.
Appendix
A.1 Description of survey data
We use individual forecasts on CPI inﬂation from professional forecasters polled by Consensus
Economics (CE). CE reports average annual growth rates of expected inﬂation for the current
and the next calendar year. However, since the forecast horizon varies for each month, the
cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts is strongly seasonal and converges towards zero at the
end of each year (Lahiri and Sheng, 2010). To obtain twelve-month-ahead inﬂation forecasts,
we follow Dovern et al. (2009) and calculate a weighted moving average of the annual forecasts.
For each month m, the ﬁxed horizon forecast is obtained by weighting the two available point
20estimates according to their respective share in the forecasting horizon, i.e., 12−m+1
12 for the
current year’s forecast and m−1
12 for the next year’s forecast. The average number of ﬁxed
horizon forecasts ranges between 16 and 32 per period, with a mean value of 25 observations.
A.2 Variables used to forecast inﬂation
Variable Transformation
Average hourly earnings (nonfarm payroll) change of growth rate
Building permits for new private housing units growth rate
Capacity utilization (manufacturing) growth rate
Crude oil index change of growth rate
Employment (nonagricultural industries) gap measure
Federal funds eﬀective rate growth rate
Interest rate spread –
M3 change of growth rate
New orders (manufacturing) growth rate
Nominal narrow eﬀective exchange rate growth rate
OECD composite leading indicators growth rate
Personal income growth rate
Retail sales growth rate
Total production gap measure
Unemployment rate gap measure
Note: “gap measure” denotes series that have been detrended with the HP-ﬁlter; “interest rate spread”
is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between interest rate on government bonds and federal funds rate.


















p(Q(1)) p(Q(3)) p(Q(6)) p(Q(9))
0.15 0.15 0.45 0.64
p(LM(1)) p(LM(3)) p(LM(6)) p(LM(9))
0.45 0.41 0.55 0.65
Note: Parameter p-values are given in brackets. p-values for a Q-test as well as an ARCH LM-test are given below.
Table A.2: Parameters and speciﬁcation tests for the TVP-GARCH model for U.S. inﬂation
21B.1 Individual uncertainty measures






















































































Figure B.1: Survey-based (iqrs, ents, rmses), forecast-based (iqrf, entf, rmsef), and model-
based (garch, ucsv) measures of inﬂation uncertainty
22iqrs ents rmses iqrf entf rmsef garch ucsv iqrs ents rmses iqrf entf rmsef garch ucsv
(∆π)2 0.33 0.31 0.30 0.21 0.22 0.37 0.26 0.42 wti −0.14 −0.15
(∆πcore)2 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.14 ppicomm −0.21 −0.20 −0.15 −0.20
∆M2 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.25 0.13 0.15 ppiind −0.20 −0.21 −0.16 −0.20
(∆M2)2 0.44 0.19 0.25 0.33 0.26 0.38 0.27 0.24 crb −0.16 −0.30 −0.34 −0.23 −0.31 −0.32 −0.14
ffr −0.40 −0.39 −0.41 −0.34 −0.32 −0.45 −0.35 −0.48 (∆wti)2 0.19 0.15 0.27 0.20 0.14 0.28
r3M −0.43 −0.43 −0.45 −0.38 −0.37 −0.48 −0.37 −0.52 (∆ppicomm)2 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.29 0.31 0.47 0.35 0.52
r10Y −0.23 −0.24 −0.19 −0.22 −0.24 −0.48 (∆ppiind)2 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.42 0.32 0.49
∆ffr −0.26 −0.25 −0.15 −0.32 −0.36 −0.24 −0.14 −0.16 (∆crbreturn)2 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.41 0.27 0.47
∆r3M −0.16 −0.16 −0.25 −0.30 ism −0.40 −0.30 −0.32 −0.50 −0.42 −0.40 −0.40 −0.30
∆r10Y ismprod −0.39 −0.29 −0.31 −0.45 −0.38 −0.37 −0.36 −0.27
abs(∆ffr) 0.22 0.25 pmi −0.40 −0.28 −0.39 −0.55 −0.50 −0.46 −0.46 −0.38
abs(∆r3M) 0.19 0.23 pmiprod −0.44 −0.29 −0.42 −0.56 −0.48 −0.49 −0.49 −0.42
abs(∆r10Y) 0.26 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.43 mhs −0.62 −0.61 −0.60 −0.72 −0.68 −0.66 −0.64 −0.65
vix 0.43 0.28 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.52 0.40 0.37 confidence −0.51 −0.53 −0.40 −0.52 −0.51 −0.44 −0.48 −0.44
ted 0.26 0.16 0.36 0.35 0.22 0.31 0.16 0.24 cu −0.47 −0.42 −0.55 −0.54 −0.53 −0.62 −0.64 −0.70
risk 0.22 0.38 0.46 0.43 0.40 0.27 0.31 cuman −0.50 −0.43 −0.58 −0.57 −0.54 −0.65 −0.66 −0.74
sp500 −0.15 −0.19 −0.20 −0.17 −0.15 cuexIT −0.51 −0.44 −0.62 −0.62 −0.59 −0.69 −0.70 −0.77
dj −0.15 −0.14 −0.18 −0.19 −0.16 −0.14 ∆y −0.57 −0.47 −0.66 −0.73 −0.65 −0.74 −0.72 −0.74
dj5000 −0.18 −0.16 −0.15 −0.17 ∆yman −0.59 −0.48 −0.66 −0.74 −0.66 −0.75 −0.73 −0.74
sp5002 0.20 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.23 0.31 0.22 (∆y)2 0.35 0.23 0.60 0.57 0.36 0.47 0.48 0.36
dj2 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.26 0.22 0.28 0.19 (∆yman)2 0.40 0.27 0.63 0.61 0.38 0.52 0.52 0.39
dj50002 0.23 0.14 0.24 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.19 ∆empl −0.54 −0.50 −0.61 −0.65 −0.63 −0.67 −0.68 −0.69
house −0.49 −0.47 −0.48 −0.65 −0.51 −0.53 −0.47 −0.38 ∆jobless 0.49 0.36 0.54 0.70 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.51
∆house ∆u 0.54 0.48 0.66 0.74 0.68 0.70 0.65 0.64
(∆house)2 0.23 0.36 0.33 0.22 0.25 0.40 0.53 0.63 ur 0.40 0.43 0.38 0.45 0.46 0.40 0.42 0.32
recession 0.46 0.37 0.46 0.63 0.57 0.57 0.46 0.46 ∆ur 0.54 0.49 0.66 0.72 0.67 0.70 0.68 0.66
Note: Numbers represent correlations signiﬁcant at the 5% level. We do not provide a number for insigniﬁcant correlations. Positive correlations
are given in bold ﬁgures. A detailed description of economic variables is presented in table B.2.
Table B.1: Correlations of uncertainty measures with economic and ﬁnancial variables
2
3Variable Description Variable Description
π Consumer Price Inﬂation brent Oil price inﬂation - Brent spot price for crude oil
πcore Core Inﬂation (Consumer Price Index less energy) wti Oil price inﬂation - West Texas Intermediate spot price for crude oil
∆π MoM change of inﬂation opec Oil price inﬂation - OPEC reference basket price for crude oil
∆πcore MoM change of core inﬂation ppicomm Producer price inﬂation - Commodities
(∆π)2 Squared change of inﬂation ppiind Producer price inﬂation - Industrial commodities
(∆πcore)2 Squared change of core inﬂation crb Commodity price inﬂation - Reuters/CRB total return index
πe Expected inﬂation from Consensus Economics (∆brent)2 Squared change of brent oil price
∆M2 MoM change of M2 money supply (∆wti)2 Squared change of WTI oil price
(∆M2)2 Squared change of M2 money supply (∆opec)2 Squared change of OPEC oil price
ffr Federal funds rate (∆ppicomm)2 Squared change of producer price inﬂation (commodities)
r3M 3-month treasury bill rate (∆ppiind)2 Squared change of producer price inﬂation (industrial commodities)
r10Y 10-year government benchmark, average yield (∆crbreturn)2 Squared returns Reuters/CRB total return index
∆ffr MoM change of federal funds rate ism ISM manufacturing total index
∆r3M MoM change of 3-month treasury bill rate ismprod ISM manufacturing production index
∆r10Y MoM Change of 10-year government benchmark rate pmi Chicago PMI total index of business activity
abs(∆ffr) Absolute change of federal funds rate pmiprod Chicago PMI production index of business activity
abs(∆r3M) Absolute change of 3-month T-Bill mhs Consumer survey index - Michigan Household Survey
abs(∆r10Y) Absolute change of 10-year government benchmark rate confidence Consumer conﬁdence index - Conference board
vix CBOE Market volatility index cu Capacity utilization rate, total industry
ted Diﬀerence between interest rates on interbank loans and treasury bill rate cuman Capacity utilization rate, manufacturing
risk Diﬀerence between interest rates on corporate bonds and government benchmarks cuexIT Capacity utilization rate, manufacturing excluding IT
sp500 Standard & Poor’s 500 Index returns ∆y Change of monthly index of industrial production
dj Dow Jones Index returns ∆yman Change of monthly index of manufacturing production
dj5000 Dow Jones 5000 Index returns (∆y)2 Squared change of industrial production
sp5002 Squared returns Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (∆yman)2 Squared change of manufacturing production
dj2 Squared returns Dow Jones Index ∆empl Change of nonfarm-payroll employment
dj50002 Squared returns Dow Jones 5000 Index ∆emplfull Change of full-time employment
house House price inﬂation by S&P/Case-Shiller ∆jobless Change of initial jobless claims
∆house MoM change of house price inﬂation ∆u Change of unemployment
(∆house)2 Squared change of house price inﬂation ur Unemployment rate
recession NBER recession dummy (recession: 1, no recession: 0) ∆ur Change of unemployment rate
Table B.2: Description of economic variables
2
4B.2 Cointegration analysis
In section 3.1, we note that the underlying uncertainty measures are rather persistent. From
a theoretical point of view, uncertainty is clearly bounded and cannot rise inﬁnitely. However,
from a statistical point of view – depending on the observed time-span – the measures may
be observationally equivalent to an integrated process. Consequently, we test each of the
variables for stationarity using the DF-GLS test and KPSS test. Test results are presented
in table B.3. According to the DF-GLS test, the null of a unit root is rejected for half of the
eight uncertainty measures. However, the KPSS test suggests that six uncertainty measures
are non-stationary at least at the 5% level. Altogether, we obtain rather mixed results.
ERS DF-GLS KPSS Lag Order
Test Stat. Test Stat. BIC
iqrs −1.51 0.70∗∗ 2
ents −0.30 0.78∗∗∗ 2
rmses −3.21∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 2
iqrf −2.57∗∗ 0.36∗ 1
entf −1.61 0.26 2
rmsef −2.74∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 2
garch −2.35∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0
ucsv 0.80 1.47∗∗∗ 14
Note: Intercept, no trend, lag length chosen according to BIC. Null for DF-GLS test: Time series has a unit
root. Null for KPSS test: Time series is stationary. Critical values for DF-GLS test statistic: -2.57 (1%),
-1.94 (5%), -1.62 (10%). Critical values for KPSS test statistic: 0.74 (1%), 0.46 (5%), 0.35 (10%).
Table B.3: DF-GLS and KPSS test
In table B.4, we also apply panel unit root tests in order to detect an individual or common
unit root in the series. Due to their cross-sectional dimension, these tests overcome the
drawback of standard unit root tests which have little power to distinguish highly persistent
stationary time series from non-stationary processes. It turns out that results are mixed
as well. While the respective tests unanimously conﬁrm the presence of a common unit root
process in the data, tests for individual unit roots indicate that a fraction of the eight measures
is stationary. However, since the null of no common trends among the series can be rejected
according to the Nyblom-Harvey test statistic, for the moment we may consider uncertainty
being observationally equivalent to an I(1) process. Note that we impose the assumption that
there is no mean reversion of individual uncertainty measures.
25Method Statistic Prob.
H0: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin and Chu t* 2.85 0.998
H0: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Hadri Z-stat 11.88 0.000
H0: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat −4.87 0.000
Pesaran’s CADF test −4.44 0.000
H0: 0 common trends among the 8 series in the panel
Nyblom-Harvey statistic 7.88∗∗∗ -
Note: Individual intercept, no trend. 2 lags used for Pesaran’s CADF test. Nyblom-Harvey (NH) test statistic
calculated by assuming serially correlated errors with nonparametric adjustment for long-run variance. Critical
values for NH test statistic: 2.52 (1%), 2.07 (5%), 1.87 (10%).
Table B.4: Panel unit root tests
We proceed by testing for cointegration among the variables. Table B.5 displays the results
from the Johansen cointegration test. Both the Trace and the Maximum Eigenvalue test
statistic indicate seven cointegration relations in the data. Hence, we conclude that there is
one common trend in the data.
λ-Trace λ-Max
Null Test Stat. Test Stat.
r = 0 457.62∗∗∗ 128.90∗∗∗
r ≤ 1 328.73∗∗∗ 92.00∗∗∗
r ≤ 2 236.73∗∗∗ 68.94∗∗∗
r ≤ 3 167.78∗∗∗ 67.50∗∗∗
r ≤ 4 100.28∗∗∗ 44.78∗∗∗
r ≤ 5 55.49∗∗∗ 37.30∗∗∗
r ≤ 6 18.20∗ 16.35∗∗∗
r ≤ 7 1.85 1.85
Note: Intercept, no trend. 2 lags were chosen according to BIC and HQIC.
Table B.5: Johansen cointegration test
We extract the common (permanent) component by means of a multivariate Beveridge-Nelson
decomposition. For this purpose, a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) of the following
form is estimated:




Γj∆yt−j + ut, (11)
where yt is a (k×1) vector of uncertainty measures, α denotes the (k×r) matrix of loadings,
β denotes the (k × r) matrix of parameters in the r = 7 cointegration relations and Γj is the
short-run coeﬃcient matrix. 2 lags where chosen according to BIC and HQIC. To obtain the














i=1 ui denotes the common trend term and y∗
0 represents initial values of the vari-
ables. The matrix Ξ has rank 1. The resulting common trend is displayed in ﬁgure B.2. It
appears that it closely mimics the uncertainty indicator introduced in section 3.2.













Note: The bold black line represents the indicator for inﬂation uncertainty (PC1), the thin red line depicts
the common trend derived from a Beveridge-Nelson decomposition. For comparability, both time series have
been normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Figure B.2: Uncertainty indicator and common trend
27B.3 Robustness of the uncertainty indicator


































































Note: The bold (red) line represents PC1. The thin line and the dashed line represent an uncertainty measure
calculated from a subsample of individual measures discarding one of the measures.
Figure B.3: Diﬀerent uncertainty indicators constructed from a subsample of individual un-
certainty measures
28B.4 Comparison to SPF measures
Some papers propose subjective probability distributions obtained from the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters (SPF) as a measure of inﬂation uncertainty (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987;
Lahiri et al., 1988). These studies distinguish between individual uncertainty, cross-sectional
dispersion, and aggregate uncertainty. First, the survey design allows for a deduction of
individual uncertainty E(σ2
i) because each respondent provides a histogram of future inﬂa-
tion. Second, it is also possible to calculate disagreement var(µi) among diﬀerent forecasters
from the mean of individual distributions. Third, a measure of aggregate uncertainty varA(π)
can be calculated if single histograms are aggregated to obtain a ﬁnite mixture distribution




i) + var(µi). (13)
In the following, we compare the uncertainty indicator from section 3.2 to the measures
derived from SPF subjective probability distributions. However, some limitations to such a
comparison should be noted. First, SPF forecasts are referring to the GDP deﬂator since
probability forecasts on the CPI inﬂation rate have only been included in the questionnaire
from 2007 onwards. Second, a number of technical assumptions needed to calculate SPF un-
certainty measures and changes in the survey design may give rise to measurement error. To
calculate SPF uncertainty, we follow D’Amico and Orphanides (2008), and Lahiri and Sheng
(2010) by using a non-parametric approach. We obtain E(σ2
i) as the average of individual
standard deviations adding a Sheppard correction. To be comparable to most other studies,
disagreement, here, is simply the cross-sectional standard deviation of the respective mean of
individual probability distributions represented by std(µi). Aggregate uncertainty is given by
calculating the standard deviation of the aggregate distribution stdA(π). We use measures
based on a ﬁxed forecast horizon of one year usually published at the end of the ﬁrst quarter.
That is, SPF data is available on a yearly frequency. To compare the monthly uncertainty
indicator with SPF measures, we take the value obtained for March of the respective year.
In ﬁgure B.4, we depict the resulting time series which have both been normalized to have
mean zero and standard deviation one.
It turns out that individual uncertainty as well as aggregate uncertainty from SPF are rather
volatile with a spike in the year 1991 and an upward movement since 2000. The uncertainty
indicator tracks E(σ2
i) quite well and both series co-move with correlation coeﬃcient 0.42. It
appears that our uncertainty indicator (PC1) is less volatile. Moreover, the recent hike in








































Note: The bold black line shows the uncertainty indicator transformed into yearly data. The thin red line
represents the respective uncertainty measure derived from SPF data.
Figure B.4: Yearly uncertainty indicator (PC1) and inﬂation uncertainty derived from SPF
inﬂation uncertainty is more pronounced. The movements of SPF disagreement are, however,
not so closely tracked by the indicator. This probably reﬂects the fact that PC1 relies on
various measures of uncertainty whereas SPF disagreement covers only a single aspect, i.e. the
cross-sectional dispersion. The largest correlation is observed for aggregate uncertainty (ρ =
0.48) which covers both, the concept of individual uncertainty and cross-sectional dispersion.
Generally speaking, the indicator broadly retraces the movements of uncertainty measures
derived from SPF.
C.1 Excluding the crisis from the sample
Figure C.1 shows the uncertainty indicator PC1 and an indicator derived from a sample that
excludes the crisis, PC12007. Diﬀerences between the measures are relatively small, in some
time periods even non-existent.
Table C.1 presents Granger causalities among diﬀerent uncertainty measures and inﬂation π
and the change in inﬂation ∆π, respectively. It appears that the eﬀects are more pronounced
once we include the recent ﬁnancial crisis into the data set. That is, Granger causality running
from inﬂation to the uncertainty indicator PC12007 is estimated with less precision, though it
is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Considering the change in inﬂation, results remain signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. Apart from ents, the results presented in table 3 are reproduced.
















Note: The bold black line represents the indicator for inﬂation uncertainty (PC1) based on the whole sample.
The thin red line labeled PC12007 represents the uncertainty indicator calculated based on a sample ending
in 2007 M8.
Figure C.1: Uncertainty indicator excluding the crisis
PC12007 irqs ents rmses iqrf entf rmsef garch ucsv
H0: π does not Granger cause IU 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.56 0.82 0.95 0.02 0.11
H0: IU does not Granger cause π 0.93 0.71 0.90 0.07 0.90 0.68 0.37 0.19 0.96
H0: ∆π does not Granger cause IU 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.40 0.62 0.91 0.95 0.02 0.20
H0: IU does not Granger cause ∆π 0.86 0.98 0.85 0.02 0.41 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.51
Note: Granger causality tests are performed for inﬂation π as well as the change of inﬂation ∆π and inﬂation
uncertainty (IU). Numbers are p-values for a Granger causality test.
Table C.1: Granger causality test for inﬂation uncertainty and inﬂation (1991-2007)
Figure C.2 shows impulse responses of PC12007 to a shock to inﬂation. When compared to
ﬁgure 5, the pattern does not change. However, the reaction of uncertainty is signiﬁcant only
at the 10% level. Hence, robustness checks suggest that our results are not driven by the
ﬁnancial crisis only. However, the years 2008 to 2010 seem to be useful to better identify the
connection between inﬂation and uncertainty.













Figure C.2: Response of inﬂation uncertainty to an inﬂation shock (1991-2007)
32C.2 Impulse responses of individual uncertainty measures





















ents (innovation in π)








rmses (innovation in π)








iqrf (innovation in π)
Note: Conﬁdence intervals are obtained from a bias adjusted bootstrap procedure (Kilian, 1998).
Figure C.3: Response of individual uncertainty measures
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Note: Conﬁdence intervals are obtained from a bias adjusted bootstrap procedure (Kilian, 1998).
Figure C.4: Response of individual uncertainty measures (contd.)
C.3 Robustness of impulse response functions
In the following, we analyze whether the response of uncertainty to an inﬂation shock is robust
to alternative VAR speciﬁcations. To this end, we specify a larger VAR which is standard
for monetary policy analysis. It includes monthly data on industrial production, consumer
prices, the federal funds rate, and inﬂation uncertainty. Note that inﬂation uncertainty is
ordered last. We consider two alternatives. First, all variables except the interest rate enter
in log-levels. Second, we include production growth and inﬂation instead of production and
the price level. The resulting impulse response functions are presented in ﬁgure C.5. It turns
out that our results remain unaﬀected by the inclusion of additional variables.




























Figure C.5: Response of inﬂation uncertainty to an inﬂation shock in a 4-variable VAR
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